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ABSTRACT 
Although Identity Management (IdM) and biometrics have been engrained in the 
business practices of private and commercial organizations for decades, the United States 
Government (USG) and the Department of Defense (DoD) have only truly started to 
institute a holistic IdM Enterprise within the last decade.  More specifically, the DoD has 
really sharpened the focus on leveraging biometrics since the beginning of the War on 
Terror.  The operational capability to distinguish Red Forces or Gray Forces from Blue 
Forces is now a common daily occurrence.  Regardless of the theater or Area of 
Operations, U.S. forces are utilizing biometrics to identify our enemies. 
In the next phase of implementing a comprehensive IdM Enterprise, the DoD is 
crafting new IdM policies, procedures, and systems that will distinguish between various 
levels of access and security controls among Blue Forces.  Blue Force IdM architectures 
are required by specific USG and DoD policies to enforce standardization in policy and 
application across all federal agencies to improve and synchronize their business 
practices.  And with many agencies crafting their own version of the future, a basic 
understanding of current IdM and biometrics requirements, as well as potential biometric 
resources, is necessary to move forward. 
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PREFACE 
Before being unwittingly thrown into the Naval Postgraduate School, I spent 
fourteen years honing my professional military skills as a Naval Helicopter Pilot.  I flew 
the slightly aged, but none-the-less potent, SH-60B Seahawk from the flight deck’s of the 
U.S. Navy’s newest and oldest surface combatants.  I amassed over 2200 flight hours and 
was individually selected for a prestigious Seahawk Weapons and Tactics Instructor 
billet.  It is the helicopter version of Top Gun for those unfamiliar.  Life was good. 
Roughly a little over four years ago, the pre-selected path I had been following 
was soon closed off.  My career took an unrecoverable blow that forced me into a degree 
program at a graduate school I had not chosen.  As circumstances sometimes end up, I 
came to enjoy my degree — Information Technology Management.  The degree program 
was tailored for future managers of the DoD Information Technology infrastructure, not 
technicians.  Which ended up being good for me, since my previous degrees were non-
technical — an MBA and a Bachelor’s in Political Science.  I enjoyed the program so 
much that I applied for and received a redesignation out of the Aviation Community and 
into the Navy’s Information Professional (IP) Community.  This was the only way to 
ensure that I would have an opportunity to apply the degree following graduation. 
During the second half of my first year, I got involved in a student run and faculty 
supported organization called Cooperative Operations and Applied Science & 
Technology Studies (COASTS).  The organization allows student volunteers to find 
opportunities for relevant thesis subjects to be evaluated in mock operational situations in 
the United States and overseas in Thailand.  There are opportunities to get involved in 
actual operational Fleet testing, but the vast majority of tests are done in a more 
controlled fashion.  In one of my first COASTS meetings, I was introduced to some 
biometric devices and quickly decided that this could be an area I could spend countless 




The original intent of my thesis had been to take an interesting and potentially 
useful dynamic signature biometric device and test it.  I would then take the testing data 
and compare its effectiveness against some of the more popular biometric devices.  
Eventually, I came to realize that my signature biometric device — the Bio-Pen by 
DynaSig — would not necessarily compare evenly against other devices.  The vast 
majority of DoD biometrics revolve around devices meant for application in an 
operational environment.  Taking the Bio-Pen and making a case that it could be a useful 
‘operational’ biometric was inherently flawed. 
As I further continued my research into biometrics, I came to understand that 
biometrics was really just a subset resource for a larger Federal Identity Management 
(IdM) Enterprise.  I also found that there were a lot of redundant instructions and work 
being done independently, especially among the individual DoD services.  This, despite 
federal and DoD policies that dictated all players use a team concept to develop and 
integrate biometrics.  The lack of cohesion was further verified from other students in a 
Distance Learning IdM certification curriculum.  The other students were a varied group 
from across federal and DoD organizations working on IdM and biometric issues every 
day. 
I eventually realized that I needed to do a thesis that summarized the current state 
of federal and DoD IdM.  With so many disparate instructions, documents, policies, 
acquisition papers, and memos detailing how IdM needs to be applied, there was no 
single understandable resource to explain the ‘Whys’ behind the ‘Whats’ of the Federal 
and DoD IdM Enterprise.  Concurrently, I wanted to discuss a potential resource in the 
growing area of Blue Force IdM and biometrics.  Just as a signature device is not suited 
for most operational applications, other biometrics may not be suited for Blue Force 
business practices.  I hope my small thesis helps other people like me interested in IdM 
and biometrics, but without any background in either, better understand some of the 
‘Whys.’
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I. IDENTITY MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Identity Management: The combination of systems, rules and 
procedures that defines an agreement between an individual and 
organization(s) regarding ownership, utilization and safeguard of 
personal identity information. 
National Science and Technology Council Biometrics Glossary 
 
In order to have an intelligent understanding about the field of Identity 
Management (IdM) within the U.S. Government (USG) and Department of Defense 
(DoD), it is necessary to have a working knowledge of the overarching documents, 
instructions, and reports that dictate the current operational and business process goals.  
One of the biggest issues in trying to understand the current situation in regards to IdM 
within the USG and DoD, is that there is no general consensus on the way ahead.  Even 
though IdM has gained a lot of attention and resources since 9/11, the majority of efforts 
are focused on Known or Suspected Terrorists (KST) and military operations.  Little 
federal attention or resources, until recently, have been allocated for Blue (friendly) Force 
IdM and internal business practices. 
This chapter sets the scene in regards to the high level guidance, wherein present 
and future decisions will be made concerning the implementation and acquisition of IdM 
Enterprise and Architecture resources.  This chapter will summarize, in as concise a 
format as possible, the most current significant and influential documents shaping the 
growing field of Federal IdM, as well as some of the implications derived as a 
consequence of their enactment.  To paraphrase my first Officer in Charge every time I 




B. NON-DOD FEDERAL DOCUMENTS 
1. Homeland Security Presidential Directives  
The events of September 11, 2001 ushered in a profound realization that it was no 
longer acceptable to slowly migrate towards specific national security requirements and 
milestones.  The ability and need to identify potential and confirmed terrorists worldwide 
was made a high priority requirement by the President for the newly formed Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS).  Through specific Homeland Security Presidential 
Directives (HSPD), the President outlined requirements with direct implications in IdM 
and biometrics throughout the federal government.  Some of the most significant HSPDs 
are detailed below. 
a. HSPD 6:  Directive on Inte gration and Use of Screening 
Information to Protect against Terrorism 
This early HSPD was released in September 2003 and addressed issues 
dealing with information on individuals known or suspected to engage in terrorist 
activities.  HSPD 6 was designed for the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State, the 
Director of Central Intelligence, and the Attorney General. The Directive specifically 
spells out (in a legallike vocabulary) two objectives towards the goal of protecting the 
United Sates against terrorists: 
(1)  Develop, integrate, and maintain thorough, accurate, and current 
information about individuals known or appropriately suspected to be or 
have been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or 
related to terrorism (aka Terrorist Information); and, 
(2)  Use that information as appropriate and to the full extent permitted by law 
to support; 
(a)  Federal, State, local, territorial, tribal, foreign-government, private-
sector screening processes; and, 
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(b)  Diplomatic, military, intelligence, law enforcement, immigration, 
visa, and protective processes (White House, HSPD 6). 
Any information gathered by HSPD 6 is directed to be provided to the 
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC).  Along with the above requirement, the 
responsible parties are required to report to the Attorney General about possible 
opportunities in which screening can and cannot be conducted. 
b. HSPD 12: Policy for a Common Identification Standard for 
Federal Employees and Contractors 
About a year after HSPD 6 was signed in August 2004, the basic 
requirement to identify terrorists and their affiliates was expanded.  It grew by mandating 
a USG-wide Identification (ID) Standard to include the protection of federal personnel 
and facilities from intrusion or attack by terrorists.  This far reaching requirement for a 
federal standard was applied to all federal employees, contractors, and contractor 
employees.  Although HSPD 12 is a mere page long, it is quite simply one of the 
foundational and most influential documents in regards to IdM requirements throughout 
the USG and DoD. 
Section 1 of HSPD 12 more clearly sets forth the overarching goals by 
stating, 
Wide variations in the quality and security of forms of identification used 
to gain access to secure federal and other facilities where there is 
potential for terrorist attacks need to be eliminated.  Therefore, it is the 
policy of the United States to enhance security, increase Government 
efficiency, reduce identity fraud, and protect personal privacy by 
establishing a mandatory, Government-wide standard for secure and 
reliable forms of identification issued by the federal Government to its 
employees, contractors, and contractor employees (White House 1). 
The Secretary of Commerce was designated as lead and directed to 
coordinate the development of a Federal Identity Standard among the Secretaries of State, 
Defense, and Homeland Security; the Attorney General; as well as the Directors of the 
Office of Management & Budget and the Office of Science and Technology Policy.  In 
accordance with the timeframe requirements spelled out in HSPD 12, the Federal ID 
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Standard was to have been promulgated six months after the date of the directive.  
Federal agencies would then have up to four months, but no more than eight months, to 
have a program in place that meets the Standard.  In February 2005, the Department of 
Commerce released the Federal Identity Standard through the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology as the Federal Information Processing Standard Publication 
201.  
2. Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 201-1 
FIPS Publication 201-1 — Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal 
Employees and Contractors is the direct result of the requirement for a single, federal 
identification standard as directed by HSPD 12.  FIPS 201-1 was released in March 2006 
to revise and update FIPS 201 that was originally released by the Department of 
Commerce on February 25, 2005.  The first and only Change Notice to FIPS was released 
on June 23, 2006 to account for changes in graphics standards on the physical PIV card 
and changes to a specific type of encoding. 
The intended goal of FIPS 201-1 in specifying an Identity Standard for federal 
agencies was 
…to achieve appropriate security assurance for the multiple applications 
by efficiently verifying the claimed identity of individuals seeking physical 
access to federally controlled government facilities and electronic access 
to government information systems (Technology iii). 
In an effort to achieve that goal incrementally, FIPS 201-1 is divided into two 
sections, Personal Identity Verification Part I (PIV-I) and Personal Identity Verification 
Part I (PIV-II).  PIV-I requirements for a common identification form (smart card) were 
to be met by October 27, 2005, while implementation guidance for architectural systems 
guidance in PIV-II would be issued at a later date by the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB).  PIV-I is all of three and half to four pages of the ninety-plus page total 
document.  Its objectives are based on HSPD 12 prerequisites that states the physical 
identification card produced in accordance with the Identity Standard must meet four 
security and reliability requirements: 
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(1)  Issued based on sound criteria for verifying an individual employee’s 
identity, 
(2)  Strongly resistant to identity fraud, tampering, counterfeiting and terrorist 
exploitation, 
(3)  Can be rapidly authenticated electronically, and, 
(4)  Issued only by providers whose reliability has been established by an 
official accreditation process (Technology iv). 
In most cases, a large portion of the federal government already had established 
forms of PIV cards that enabled a short timeframe to be mandated.  Despite these 
‘mandatory’ requirements, FIPS 201-1 gave federal agencies an exception clause to the 
fourth requirement by later stating agencies could either ‘self-accredit’ or ‘use other 
accredited issuers’ until PIV Section II had been made officially (Technology v).  PIV-I 
continues on to describe the Identification Standard’s primary objectives in regards to 
control, identity spoofing and registration, issuance and maintenance, as well as privacy 
requirements.  Throughout the document, it is reiterated that individual agencies are not 
being forced into using a single credential type.  They are allowed to determine the 
specific card or cards they wish to use and the level of access authority asserted by the 
card.  Whatever the specific credential form chosen by an agency, however, it must meet 
all of the criteria spelled out in PIV-I. 
PIV-II delves deeper into the technical specifications for a holistic PIV system.  It 
further elaborates on the component specifications and processes that ensure 
interoperability of PIV cards among federal agencies in regards to access control, 
authentication, and systems management.  A pictorial overview of a generic PIV system 





(1)  PIV Front-End Subsys tem: Included is the physical PIV card, card and 
biometric readers, personal identification number (PIN) input device; 
(2)  PIV Card Issuance and Management Subsystem : Includes components 
for identity spoofing and registration, card and key issuance and 
management, and the various repositories and services required as part of 
the verification infrastructure (e.g., PKI directory, certificate status 
servers…); and, 
(3)  Access Control Subsystem : Includes the physical and logical access 
control systems, protected resources, and the authorization data 
(Technology 10). 
 
Figure 1.   Notional PIV System Model 
When the three subsystems of the overall Personal Identity Verification — II 
architecture are completed by the individual federal departments or agencies, it will 
ensure secure, homogenous, and adaptable identity management.  By conforming to the 
technical standards of Card Issuance and Management, every federal agency is assured 
that the individual and the smart card presented for physical or logical access to their 
resources have been vetted, registered, and approved for appropriate certificate and key 
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usage.  This should be further verified when the individual and their PIV card interact 
seamlessly with the every agencies’ card reader, biometric scanner, or PIN device built to 
Front-End specifications.  And lastly, if the individual mistakenly or surreptitiously 
attempts to access data or facilities above their authority, logical and physical Access 
Control subsystems will prevent their efforts and alert the proper authorities as required.  
A continuous feedback loop within the PIV architecture maintains secure IdM as long as 
all PIV systems are scrupulously built to the specifications. 
Throughout the document, it is consistently reiterated that the need for uniformity 
and standardization across all federal agencies and departments drives the PIV effort.  By 
standardizing specific physical and logical components among all federal agencies, the 
enormous benefits derived from economies of scale can be achieved.  Agencies are not 
required to purchase the same hardware or software, but all their hardware and software 
must be able to interact based on the same language spelled out in FIPS 201-1.  When the 
underlying subsystems of a PIV architecture are able to exchange data through adherence 
to dedicated standards, federal agencies will no longer waste resources producing 
multiple identification cards, will decrease the chances for identity fraud with 
repetitiously stored Personally Identifiable Information (PII), and will increase the level 
of trust in IdM among agencies. 
3. National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) Identity 
Management Task Force 
In the field of IdM and biometrics, the National Science and Technology Council 
is a very influential organization inside and outside the Executive Office of the President.  
The Council and its various Committees and Subcommittees are continuously designing 
the federal IdM and biometrics landscape through coordination, research, and policy 
recommendations to the President.  The website for the National Science and Technology 
Council (NSTC) has a concise and informative description of the Council and its purpose.  
It states, 
The National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) was established by 
Executive Order (12881) on November 23, 1993 (House).  This Cabinet-
level Council is the principal means within the executive branch to 
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coordinate science and technology policy across the diverse entities that 
make up the federal research and development enterprise.  Chaired by the 
 
President, the membership of the NSTC is made up of the Vice President, 
the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, Cabinet 
Secretaries and, and other White House officials. 
A primary objective of the NSTC is the establishment of clear national 
goals for federal science and technology investments in a broad array of 
areas spanning virtually all the mission areas of the executive branch.  
The Council prepares research and development strategies that are 
coordinated across federal agencies to form investment packages aimed at 
accomplishing multiple national goals.  The work of the NSTC is 
organized under four primary committees: Science, Technology, 
Environment and Natural Resources and Homeland and National 
Security.  Each of these committees oversees subcommittees and working 
groups focused on different aspects of science and technology and 
working to coordinate across the federal government (President). 
Appendix A offers a succinct visual representation of the four committees of the 
Council, as well as their individual subcommittees.  From the brief description of the 
NSTC, it is slightly misleading as to the membership of the Council.  If a formal list of 
the “Cabinet Secretaries and Agency Heads with significant science and technology 
responsibilities” were to be listed, the list would cover over two dozen of the U.S. 
Government’s most powerful departments and agencies.  The President also has the 
eternal right to add from time to time “such officials of executive departments or agencies 
as the President may (House)”  In short, this one Executive Order created a Council with 
an exceptionally large collection of powerful federal officials. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity 
Management within the NSTC’s Committee on Technology deals specifically with the 
subject material.  A pictorial of the Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity 
Management’s structure is provided below in Figure 2 (Blackburn).  The Subcommittee 
on Biometrics and Identity Management was permanently tasked by the NSTC’s 
Committee on Technology since inception in 2002 to: 
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a. In Regards to Biometrics 
1. Provide technical leadership in the development and 
implementation of interoperable federal biometrics 
systems; 
2. Develop and implement multi-agency investment strategies 
that advance biometric sciences to meet public and private 
needs; 
3. Develop and adopt biometric standards as specified in the 
NSTC Policy for Enabling the Development, Adoption, and 
Use of Biometrics Standards; and, 
4. Develop consensus strategic outreach plans for biometrics, 
including collaboration on www.biometrics.gov, the annual 
Biometric Consortium Conference and other events. 
b. In Regards to Identity Manage ment (of whic h Biometr ics is a  
Subset)
1. Identify cross-sector IdM issues, and develop and 
implement plans to address the federal government’s 
priority S&T need; 
2. Facilitate the inclusion of privacy-protecting principles in 
IdM system design; 
3. In January 2008, the Promote a scientifically educated and 
aware public that properly understands IdM technologies, 
federal programs and issues; and, 
4. Strengthen international and public sector partnerships to 




Figure 2.   Subcommittee on Biometrics & IdM Structure 
Subcommittee for Biometrics and Identity Management was further 
directed by the NSTC to form a Task Force (TF) on Identity Management.  The Task 
Force lasted for six months and was charged with three primary objectives: 
(1) Provide an assessment of the current state of IdM in the U.S. 
Government; 
(2) Develop a vision for how IdM should operate in the future; and, 
(3) Develop first-step recommendation on how to advance toward their 
vision (Council, Identity Management Task Force Report 2008, ES-2). 
The Task Force approached the assignment from two different angles 
realizing they had a limited amount of time to summarize an extremely large subject.  A 
portion of the TF’s resources were used to assess publicly available Privacy Impact 
Assessments (PIA) which spell out the privacy impact of any substantially revised or new 
Information Technology System (Security).  PIAs were first mandated by the E-
Government Act of 2002 in recognition that advances in Information Technology also 
had important ramifications on the protection of personal information contained in 
government records and systems (Security). 
The second approach was to coordinate with the Office of Management 
and Budget to conduct a survey of the Federal Chief Information Officer’s Council.  The 
scope of the survey and TF’s overall report tried to address uses of Federal IdM in every 
possible way internal and external to the federal government, to include between the 
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federal government and international organizations or commercial entities.  Wherever a 
Federal IdM system could possibly be used or accessed, the TF attempted to evaluate.  
The TF on Identity Management also used the following definition of Identity 
Management as part of its methodology to benchmark the concept for those surveyed, 
The combination of technical systems, rules, and procedures that define 
the ownership, utilization, and safeguard of personal identity information.  
The primary goal of the Identity Management process is to assign 
attributes to a digital identity and to connect that identity to an individual 
(Council, Identity Management Task Force Report 2008, ES-1). 
Some of the big picture findings from the combined efforts were that there 
are more than 3000 IdM-related systems within just the federal government that utilize 
some form of Personally Identifiable Information (PII)1.  Remember, this does not 
include any non-federal systems that may interact with USG systems.  Not surprisingly, 
the preponderance of these systems were designed, utilized, and managed in their own 
independent ‘stovepipes.’  Another finding from the TF’s efforts was the lack of an 
agreedupon definition for “Identity Management.”  It’s not difficult to see how disparate 
IdM systems are so incompatible when there is no aggreement on a common definition of 
IdM.  Among the more than 3000 systems, roughly only fifteen percent collect or use 
biometrics, security questions, or tokens (Dray).  PINs, login aliases, passwords, date of 
birth, and Social Security numbers are the most common forms of IdM information 
collected (Dray). 
The major consequences noted from this lack of a Federal IdM Enterprise 
are 
(1)  Duplicative identity data is often stored in multiple locations 
within the same agency, as well as across agencies, causing a 
negative impact on accuracy and complicating an individual’s 
attempt at redress; 
                                                 
1 Personally Identifiable Information (PII) is defined by the NTSC as “[t]he information pertaining to 
any person which makes it possible to identify such individual (including the information capable of 
identifying a person when combined with other information even if the information does not clearly 
identify the person)”. This may be interpreted as “any information which identifies a person to any degree”. 
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(2)  A lack of commonly used standards makes appropriate cross-
function collaboration difficult, thus impacting both time-sensitive 
mission needs as well as reducing personal privacy; 
(3)  Privacy protection efforts vary in complexity across agencies; and, 
(4)  There is no single government-wide forum responsible for 
coordinating and homogenizing IdM efforts across the U.S. 
government (Council, Identity Management Task Force Report 
2008, ES-3). 
The Task Force on Identity Management concurrently identified four 
major opportunities that could systematically demonstrate a return on investment.  The 
first was the ability to capitalize on existing investments in digital infrastructure.  
Through the previously discussed FIPS 201, the federal government has established 
technical standards to create basic identifications for employees.  Even though there is 
currently not a robust Federal IdM infrastructure to support the full utilization of these 
ID’s, the common FIPS 201 standard enables the prospect for design and implementation 
of FIPS capable systems throughout the USG (Council, Identity Management Task Force 
Report 2008, 14). 
The second opportunity the TF identified for a Federal IdM Enterprise was 
the ability to achieve multiple efficiencies in design and use (Council, Identity 
Management Task Force Report 2008, 15).  Because there is an enormous amount of 
repetitive data residing on literally thousands of disparate systems, a federated IdM 
architecture would alleviate this redundant waste.  Surplus and cumulatively expensive 
resources storing and managing the same data would be eliminated.  Centralized data 
would be more easily updated and available to all systems under proper access controls.  
And most importantly, the chances for compromised data would be dramatically 
decreased because there would be limited access to a single secured repository of data, 
and there would be auditing mechanisms enabling the ability to more quickly determine 
breaches or violations of integrity. 
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Third, the data management standards and policies of separate 
architectures would be harmonized through standardization (Council, Identity 
Management Task Force Report 2008, 15).  The resources and policies of every Federal 
IdM system would be built upon the same foundation of hardware, software, and policy 
standards.  This would allow each agency or organization the flexibility to acquire the 
systems that work best for them, AND be interoperable with the systems of every other 
agency.  And lastly, the standardization of IdM systems would allow for a true single 
sign-on access across multiple systems (Council, Identity Management Task Force 
Report 2008, 15).  There would no longer be a need to continuously remember or write-
down PIN’s or passwords for each and every system.  This in turn would reduce potential 
security risks.  If every system operated under the same standards and guidelines, every 
system would accept any vetted individual’s access authority by near or instantaneous 
verification of credentials. 
The data and findings gathered by the Subcommittee on Biometrics and 
Identity Management’s Task Force on Identity Management will be used to craft the 
vision for a federated approach to a Federal IdM Enterprise.  To this end, the Task 
Forces’ seven top-level goals follow: 
(1) Configuration and operation of a “network of networks” to securely 
manage digital identities, based on a set of common data elements for stored PII that will 
allow it to be leveraged by a broad range of applications; 
(2) Security of process, data transmission, and storage; this includes and 
embraces all features of confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and privacy, including use 
of encryption and multifactor authentication; 
(3) Auditability of processes, with complete, automatic, and secure record 
keeping; 
(4) Ubiquitous availability, at global distances, of strong verification of 
stored digital identity when called for or needed to support an authorized application; 
(5) Standards-based connectivity, interoperability, and extensibility of 
supporting IT architecture; 
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(6) Preservation of application-specific PII data under control of 
application sponsors, with minimal exposure to unauthorized access or unnecessary 
transmission across networks; and, 
(7) Ability of prospective application sponsors to develop, install, and 
operate applications in a way that permits the supporting IT grid to be seen as a freely 
available, ubiquitous service (Council, Identity Management Task Force Report 2008, 
ES-5). 
C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DOCUMENTS 
1. Overview 
IdM as a business and operational construct is relatively new to the Department of 
Defense.  The applications and hardware for biometrics have been more heavily 
developed as a result of the War on Terror, but it has only been understood in the last few 
years that biometrics is actually just a subset of a larger IdM vision.  As a result, the DoD 
does not have any formal IdM Enterprise instructions to date.  They are either currently in 
development or have appeared as conceptual statements in other documents.  Through 
research, there are references to documents like the DoD Roadmap to Identity 
Superiority and the DoD Identity  Protection and Management Visio n in some GAO 
reports and other DoD high-level documents.2  For whatever the reasons, these 
documents do not appear on any DoD or reference websites. It is possible they never 
made it to a final approved draft or the vision is still uncertain.  The fact that the DoD 
does not have concrete guidance for an IdM Enterprise or Architecture speaks volumes to 
the DoD’s current lack of IdM focus.  The following documents are the closest to 
approved and accessible guidance for specific aspects of DoD IdM. 
                                                 
2 As an example, a September 2008 GAO Report titled DEFENSE MANAGEMENT: DOD Needs to 
Establish Clear Goals and Objectives, Guidance, and a Designated Budget to Manage Its Biometrics 
Activities states”,…in September 2006, the (DOD CIO’s) Identity Protection and Management Senior 
Coordinating Group produced a draft Roadmap to Identity Superiority.  This document provides a more 
specific strategic vision of biometrics and some associated programs, including specific goals and expected 
timelines. However, DOD officials told us that the document has not been finalized. 
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2. Deputy Secretary of Defense Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 
08-006:  “DoD Implementation of Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive — 12 (HSPD-12)” 
The threepage memo (six pages total with an attachment on responsibilities) 
released 26 November 2008 stated that it immediately establishes a DoD policy for the 
implementation of Personal Identity Verification Section I.  As previously discussed, PIV 
I details the implementation of a smart card for all DoD employees, contractors, and 
employees of contractors who request or have a need to access DoD facilities and 
resources.  The memo, however, does not mention anywhere about policy pertaining to 
PIV Section II, or the larger Personal Identity Verification Architecture.  The memo also 
states that it should be replaced by a formal DoD Instruction within 180 days (Defense). 
In order to meet the requirements of Homeland Security Presidential Directive -
12, the DoD’ Common Access Card (CAC) will be the official identity credential and be 
accepted by all DoD Components.  The CAC can be used for logical or physical access to 
DoD facilities and resources.  Although the CAC is to be the accepted DoD identity 
credential, it will be at the discretion of individual federal facilities and information 
systems managers to grant or deny access.  Furthermore, upgrades to the current Real-
time Personnel Identification Systems (RAPIDS) will be made to ensure that the CAC 
and CAC issuance process fully complies with HSPD-12.  This progression is expected to 
occur over the next four years as current CAC’s expire and RAPIDS receives the 
necessary upgrades (Defense). 
3. Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 1000.25 
DoDD 1000.25 — DoD Personnel Identity Protection (PIP) Program was 
originally promulgated in July 2004, but was updated in April 2007.  This directive 
cancels and replaces three previous DoD Directives and Instructions relating to military 
and civilian IDs, as well as the Defense Enrollment and Eligibility Reporting System 
(DEERS).  Its purpose as stated, 
The PIP shall be the Department of Defense’s program for: addressing 
threats to the individual personal privacy of its Members, employees, and 
beneficiaries; establishing a secure and authoritative process for the 
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issuance and use of identity credentials on the Department of Defense; 
and ensuring that DoD benefits and access to DoD physical and logical 
assets are granted on authenticated and secure identity information. (USD 
(P&R)) 
Although not specifically an IdM instruction, DoDD 1000.25 works hand-in-hand 
anywhere HSPD-12 and the DoD’s Common Access Card are applicable.  As such, it 
appears and reappears in a multitude of DoD and Service instructions, directives, and 
policy statements of varying importance.  The PIP program influences all of the 
following systems that operate within the sphere of identity implementation and 
operations: DEERS, RAPIDS, Defense Biometric Identification System (DBIDS), 
Defense Cross-Credentialing Identification System (DCCIS), Defense National Visitors 
Center (DNVC), and the Defense Non-Combatant Evacuation (NEO) Operations 
Tracking Systems (DNTS) (USD (P&R)). 
Oversight of the PIP Program is delegated to the Identity Protection and 
Management Senior Coordinating Group (IPMSCG) under the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Network and Information Integration) (ASD/NII) and DoD Chief Information 
Officer (CIO) (USD (P&R)).  The IPMSCG must ensure that the PIP Program is ready to 
add additional capabilities and systems as technologies emerge in the future.  In essence, 
the PIP Program is a scaled-version of an IdM Architecture that seeks to implement and 
leverage standardization of identity credentialing and processing across the varying DoD 
identity systems. 
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II. BIOMETRICS OVERVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Biometrics: As a characteristic: A measurable biological 
(anatomical and physiological) and behavioral characteristic that can be 
used for automated recognition. 
As a process: Automated methods of recognizing a biometric subject 
based on measurable biological (anatomical and physiological) and 
behavioral characteristics. 
 
²National Science and Technology Council Biometrics Glossary 
 
As with the field of Identity Management, biometrics in the USG and DoD is in a 
state of controlled chaos.  Biometrics, however, is far more advanced in operational 
application, business use, and policy formation.  Referencing Appendix B will give an 
appreciation for the language that has already evolved around the subject.  There are a lot 
of initiatives and programs with only limited coordination between them, whether it is a 
Special Operations Unit taking multi-modal biometrics into the mountains of Afghanistan 
or a diligent TSA employee verifying the biometrics of a foreign traveler coming into the 
United States.  Resources are being wasted through duplication of efforts, a lack of 
interconnectedness among databases, and an inability of most IdM or biometrics systems 
to simply exchange or verify data with another system even if connected. 
For a long time, biometrics was seen as a separate resource in identifying Red or 
Gray forces, and occasionally Blue forces.  As resources for and the actual application of 
biometrics expanded after 9/11, biometrics was better understood to be a component of 
the wider field of Identity Management.  Initial versions of federal IdM architectures or 
enterprises began to take shape, and biometrics became the tool by which better 
information and intelligence could be gathered and shared.  This chapter summarizes and 
quotes from the latest iterations of both federal and DoD documents that describe how 
biometrics is expected to be applied currently and in the future.  Most documents are 
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relatively new by DoD standards, and account for the information on biometrics already 
acquired and the acceptance that biometrics is no longer a separate field.  In regards to 
how biometrics is specifically employed on a daily basis, this topic will be more 
thoroughly handled in the next chapter. 
B. NON-DOD FEDERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
As a tool in the implementation of a Federal IdM Enterprise, the use and 
application of biometrics has truly gained momentum.  Despite the fact that commercial 
businesses and organizations have been using biometrics for decades, the USG and DoD 
have only become serious about the implementation of biometrics since the Global War 
on Terror began at the end of 2001.  Even then, the vast majority of applications that took 
advantage of the benefits of biometrics were operational systems used to distinguish Red 
and Gray forces from Blue Forces, but not among varying grades of Blue Forces.   
Over the last few years, however, a drive and accompanying resources have been 
applied towards evaluating biometrics systems for business and operational systems that 
distinguish Blue Forces from other Blue Forces.  From a general business perspective, the 
greatest security threat is still the Insider Threat.  There is a specific and quantifiable need 
to distinguish people by access to facilities, privileges to applications, or basic security 
levels.  In the federal government and DoD, one only has to do a quick search on Google 
or any news source to find plentiful examples of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) 
that was randomly lost or stolen by federal and DoD employees.  Laptops with little or no 
security features installed and enabled continue to disappear or remain unaccounted for 
that potentially disclose the private medical, social security, and personal information of 
hundreds of thousands of active duty military, retirees, and civil servants.  This problem 
grows exponentially when you realize that only recently have security standards been 
enacted that each federal agency or organization is held accountable to meeting.  Dig 
deeper and these issues multiply again after the realization that divisions and departments 
within individual agencies do not always use a single standard, and often do not even 
effectively attempt to coordinate their efforts. 
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1. HSPD 24 and National Security Presidential Directive 56: Biometrics 
for Identification and Screening to Enhance National Security 
HSPD 24 is a very recent directive in the larger vision for biometrics with a 
publication date of June 5, 2008 (White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
24).  The Directive instructed the Attorney General to have a plan of action within 90 
days that has been coordinated with the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland 
Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Director of the Office of Science 
and Technology Policy.  Following the submittal of the plan, all of the responsible parties 
would have a year to submit a report outlining their implementation of the directive, an 
action plan, and any additional actions required for implementation. 
Although HSPD 24 does not specifically address the use of biometrics for Blue 
Force identification and screening, HSPD 24 does seek to unify the efforts of federal 
agencies in regards to the collection, use, and sharing of terrorist biometric data.  
Specifically, HSPD 24 states, 
Many agencies already collect biographical and biometric information in 
their identification and screening processes.  With improvements in 
biometric technologies, and in light of its demonstrated value as a tool to 
protect national security, it is important to ensure agencies use compatible 
methods and procedures in the collection, storage, use, analysis, and 
sharing of biometric information (White House, Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 24). 
Furthermore, HSPD 24 gives more explicit direct direction on how to achieve the 
goal. 
Through integrated processes and interoperable systems, agencies shall, 
to the fullest extent permitted by law, make available to other agencies all 
biometric and associated biographical and contextual information 
associated with persons for whom there is an articulable and reasonable 
basis for suspicion that they pose a threat to national security (White 
House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 24). 
Interestingly, the definition chosen for use only covers the characteristic portion 
of biometrics.  It does not mention the second half of biometrics as a process like written 
in the NSTC version in Appendix B.  As a process, “biometrics” is defined as automated 
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methods of recognizing a biometric subject based on measurable biological (anatomical 
and physiological) and behavioral characteristics.  With the stated intention of this 
directive to force federal agencies to work together, it would have been prudent to also 
emphasize the process half of biometrics to the intended audience. 
2.  The National Biometrics Challenge 
In August 2006, the National Science and Technology Council’s Subcommittee 
on Biometrics (now called the Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management) 
published a report titled “The National Biometrics Challenge.” The intent of this report 
was to lay out a common agenda of challenges and opportunities for the ‘biometrics 
community’ — government, industry, and academia.  In developing this report and its 
attending multiple lists, the NSTC Subcommittee on Biometrics analyzed the 
distinctiveness of biometrics as an identification tool, market and social forces 
influencing biometric applications, and requirements for future capabilities (Biomtrics 1).  
Although the use of biometrics is becoming more commonplace, applications are usually 
stovepiped and disconnected.  Current security and business requirements are dictating 
highly interconnected biometric systems to rapidly ID personnel across any operational 
environment. 
As a capability in the larger architecture of IdM, biometrics has some distinct 
advantages over other identity processes.  Biometrics is currently the best available real-
time capability for identifying personnel.  Secondly, the direct attachment of biometrics 
to an individual allows it to be integrated and layered with other security or verification 
resources.  Third, biometrics that are scalable and interoperable facilitate the 
identification of repetitive biometric data across the enterprise.  Lastly, biometrics are 
difficult, though not impossible, to copy or compromise because they are tied to a 
specific individual’s characteristics — physiological and behavioral. Overall, the 
calculable benefits of bioimetrics when applied in a holistic enterprise architecture are 
valuable resources saved by eliminating redundant data, increased effectiveness through 
shared data, and improved security by layering and overlapping applications  (Biometrics 
4). 
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Following all their research, the Subcommittee on Biometrics narrowed the 
influences driving the evolution of biometrics into the following four primary forces: 
1. National Security. 
2. Homeland security and law enforcement. 
3. Enterprise and e-government services. 
4. Personal information and business transactions. 
There were also a collection of specific needs identified across each of the four primary 
forces.  One of those was the need to accurately ID individuals in real-time in order to 
distiguish threats from unknowns or friendly forces.  In order to do this, the 
Subcommittee identified the need for accurate, rugged, multi-modal biometrics that rely 
on standards that imporve interoperability across agencies.  Another need was enterprise 
and e-government services which streamline and secure recognition to create ‘federated 
identities’ across organizational boundaries and ensure privacy standards.  A third 
requirement was personal and business transaction solutions that decrease identity theft in 
cost-effictive and user intuitive ways. 
Four prominent challenges were then identified as the most significant in regards 
to the primary forces: 
1. Improve collection devices (biometrics sensors). 
2. Develop more efficient and effective large-scale operational capabilities 
(biometrics systems). 
3. Establish standards for plug-and-play performance (biometrics systems 
interoperability). 
4. Enable informed debate on why, how, and when biometrics should and 
can be used (biometrics communications and privacy) (Biomtrics 2). 
These four challenges cut across all four of the previously mentioned primary forces to 
one degree or another. 
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If the required needs already discussed could be filled, there would be substantial 
benefits to be gained across both the public and private sectors.  When the biometric 
sensors are designed and produced to specifications, real-time biometric data could be 
transmitted in almost any environment to support law enforcement, military, or homeland 
security positive identifications of KSTs or foreign visitors.  Systems could lose or 
change out sensors without any degradations.  Biometric architectures in a standards 
driven environment would no longer be hamstrung to specific vendors.  Confidence by 
both owners and customers would increase even as biometrics systems scale up to 
enterprise levels.  Biometric data would be consistent across the enterprise without 
wasteful duplication as biometric systems reach real interoperability.  Lastly, informed 
debate about the application of biometrics and the societal implications would demystify 
the technology and improve overall cooperation (Biomtrics 13-16). 
C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTIONS 
1. Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 8521.01E: Department of 
Defense Biometrics 
DODD 8521.01E was released in February 2008 by then Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Gordon England.  Like most DoD directives, it stated in clear terms who had 
been designated to which position and what their specific responsibilities were to be.  The 
major significance of this document is that it consolidated numerous previous biometrics 
and related instructions, as well as making slight adjustments to the DoD biometrics 
chain of command.  Under this instruction, the DoD Biometrics Principal Staff Assistant 
is the Director, Defense Research & Engineering under the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.  Whereas the Secretary of the Army had 
previously been designated the DoD Executive Agent (EA) for just integration of 
biometrics technologies, the Secretary was now designated EA for all DoD biometrics 
(Defense, Department of Defense Biometrics). 
In order to establish a common language for discussing biometrics, this DoD 
instruction notes that it is using the NSTC Subcommittee on Biometrics Glossary 
(Appendix B of this thesis).  This will help ensure that both military and civilians alike 
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can understand one another when talking and writing about biometrics.  The Policy 
section of the Directive reiterates a lot of previously mentioned requirements such as the 
requirement to improve efficiency and effectiveness, eliminate redundant efforts, 
coordinate through the EA to leverage current acquisitions, develop systems for 
interoperability, develop continuity of operations for contingencies, and that all 
biometrics data shall be maintained and controlled by the DoD.  Under the 
Responsibilities section, the requirement to ensure that DoD meets all the requirements of 
HSPD 12 fall to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.  The Under 
Secretary also has the major task for ensuring all policies and procedures for IdM and ID 
protection meet current DoD biometric capabilities and standards.  A significant 
responsibility when noted that the area of DoD Blue Force biometrics is where significant 
resources and thought are shifting towards.  More specific details about how the 
Secretary of the Army as EA for Biometrics is concretely applying his responsibilities in 
operational biometrics is found next in Chapter III on the Biometrics Task Force. 
2. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense 
Biometrics 
In April 2006, the Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) requested the formation of a Task Force on Defense 
Biometrics from the Defense Science Board (DSB).  The USD (AT&L) stated that the 
Department of Defense was working in an ad hoc and reactive fashion to the ever 
increasing demands for biometrics and IdM technologies.  The DoD was still operating 
under a pre-9/11 mindset defined by pre-9/11 guidance (TF on Biometrics 93).  The 
official USD (AT&L) memorandum required interim results by May 2006 and a final 
report by November 2006.  Research was completed in September 2006 by the DSB Task 
Force on Biometrics, and the final report presented to the USD (AT&L) in March 2007. 
One of the first points made in the Report’s Executive Summary was the TF’s 
summary conclusion that the real topic was the DoD’s IdM posture, not just current 
biometrics capabilities.  Biometrics is an important technology in the larger DoD IdM 
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Enterprise, but still just one piece of the overall IdM puzzle.  The theme driven home is 
that biometrics is but one means towards a holistic IdM Enterprise.  The TF of Defense 
Biometrics then identified six top level interim findings summarized below: 
1. The importance of identity management and the role of biometrics in the 
Department of Defense are underappreciated. 
2. The present management structure largely reflects pre-9/11 requirements: 
a “blue” focus inside DoD, and conceived in the context of information 
assurance. 
3. Urgent battlefield needs are not being met.  The current “program” 
appears to lack the necessary warfighter customer orientation. 
4. Requirements will continue to grow as current business processes scale 
up, as new applications come on line, as the adversaries adapt and as new 
threats emerge. 
5. Technology is changing for the better.  New technologies must be inserted 
rapidly. 
6. There appears to be considerable benefit in a Department-wide authority 
for identity management and biometrics, accountable and responsible for 
its funding, policy, vision and direction, and sustainment (TF on 
Biometrics 3). 
The DSB TF on Defense Biometrics Report elaborated on DoD issues with 
biometrics in both technological and organizational contexts.  In both contexts, the 
Report intentionally and continuously related the issues and material back to how they 
should support broader DoD IdM processes.  When the Report elaborated on the general 
role of biometrics, it stated that biometric processes themselves “offer the high assurance 
of uniqueness in initial registration, and added confidence to ID assertion” (TF on 
Biometrics 15).  The TF also concluded that any ID related processes cannot be accurate 
without biometrics, because it is necessary to positively link an individual asserting an 
identity to a historical digital biometric instance of the individual.  Another point made in 
the TF Report was that the initial introduction of biometrics to the public after 9/11 
created a sense of mistrust and misunderstanding because the government failed to 
clearly and adequately explain what was being done and why.  More recently, the public 
has cautiously accepted biometrics as they have become more educated about the 
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technology and more accustomed through exposure.  Lastly, the perfromance 
measurements of biometrics have moved beyond the inflated rhetoric of original gradiose 
expectations to realistic probabilities of potential applications (TF on Biometrics 15). 
A three category system for identifying personnel or resources, that is referred to 
as the Identification Trinity, is described by the Report.  The three categories that make 
up the ID Trinity are: (1) something you have, (2) something you know, and (3) 
something you are.  The strength of the authentication increases when ID processes use 
two or all of the categories in combination to make a positive ID.  The most common 
form of ID has, and continues to be, something an individual has.  Examples like a birth 
certificate or drivers license are the mainstay of attempting to prove one’s identity.  These 
physical objects are commonly referred to as tokens in the IdM lexicon3.  Something you 
know is also a very commonly used identifier.  Examples of these include passwords, 
PINs, or answers to pass phrases.  Authenticators from this category are easy to produce, 
but also easily compormised through social engineering or simple laziness.  The third 
category of something you are comprises the physical and behavioral features that most 
uniquely identify one individual from another.  These features do not need to be 
memorized, are harder to duplicate, and harder to deny during an authentication process.  
Biometrics is this third category. 
When the TF on Defense Biometrics completed their research, they generated 
forty-six recommendations broken down into six categories: Information Management 
and Information Sharing Issues; R&D, Materiel and Technology Issues; Issues Beyond 
the Department of Defense; Issues Within the Department of Defense; DoD 
Organizational Issues; and, Legal and Privacy Issues.  The most relevant 
recommendations dealing directly with biometrics and the application of biometrics are: 
 
 
                                                 
3 As previously mentioned, HSPD -12 outlines the requirements for a strong common identity 
credential (or token).  The DoD Common Access Card currently used meets HSPD-12 requirements for a 
FIPS-201 compliant token. 
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a. Information Management and Information Sharing Issues 
Recommendation 19: The OSD PSA for Biometrics, with the ASD/NII, 
should ensure that scalability issues are addressed specifically in anticipation of scaling 
key identity management systems and processes globally. 
Recommendation 42: That the PSA for Biometrics cause the issue of using 
the biometric, itself, for remote authentication across a broad multi-use network to be re-
examined.  Participants in the re-evaluation would include, inter alia, the CIOs, the ASD 
(NII), and the DIRNSA (TF on Biometrics 86). 
b. R&D, Materiel and Technology Issues 
Recommendation 3: The PSA for Biometrics should undertake to develop 
field-deployable DNA collection and matching equipment that requires less skill to 
achieve operationally worthy results, and the data architecture for accessing repositories 
for match should be designed and deployed apace.  Additionally, the PSA, in coordinate 
with appropriate authorities, should investigate options related to organizational, physical 
and/or data collocation with other/larger elements of the total DoD biometrics/IM 
enterprise. 
Recommendation 6: Conduct research focused on defining, verifying, 
quantifying and improving biometrics collection/matching performance in multi-modal 
systems.  Evaluate alternative methods for comparing and weighting results of matching 
algorithms of different biometric modalities within a single system; seek to establish 
optimal mixes/combinations of modalities in various applications and scenarios.  
Examine issues specifically related to multi-modal data storage and system architecture. 
Recommendation 8: Support research efforts by DARPA and others into 
extended-range human biometric identifiability and tracking.  Explore feasibility of 
“unattended surveillance” of larger areas.  Examine applicability of biometrically-based 
capability for long-range identity assertion in operational scenarios. 
 
 27
Recommendation 10: Quantify, operationalize, and improve upon 3D as a 
basic biometric modality.  Explore development of coherent, bi-static 3D imagery 
collection capability, with cameras separated over some distance.  Conduct an ongoing, 
basic-research effort in biometrics, seeking to discover new modalities, and previously-
unknown insights from existing collection and operational biometrics.  Seek to identify 
and operationalize promising new areas of biometrics application, appropriately. 
Recommendation 14: Support multi-agency research to identify and refine 
possible new biometric modalities related to residual/latent information (TF on 
Biometrics 87-88). 
c. Issues beyond the Department of Defense 
Recommendation 24: The OSD PSA for Biometrics should establish the 
policy and technology basis for associating biometrics with the broader field of Identity 
Management in the whole range of DoD applications and requirements, and support 
interagency efforts to do the same. 
d. Issues within the Department of Defense 
Recommendation 36: The OSD PSA should work with USD/P&R to 
establish an “Identity Management Community” within the DoD, to establish, support 
and manage a career-long continuum of training, education and professional development 
in this field. 
Recommendation 38: The OSD PSA for Biometrics, in coordination with 
and supported by the USD/P&R, should examine the model used to support and 
encourage the emergence of Information Assurance (IA) as a recognized and accredited 
academic discipline in the 1990s, in terms of its possible relevance for reproduction and 




Recommendation 46: The OSD PSA for Biometrics, in coordination with 
appropriate authorities, should seek the creation of comprehensive security policy or 
policies for biometrics.  Such policy should embrace all phases of developmental and 
operational use, and all other relevant considerations. 
e. DoD Organizational Issues 
**Note: Recommendations in this section are repeated in other categories. 
f. Legal and Privacy Issues 
Recommendation 40: The Department of Defense, if not the USG, must 
seek to engage responsible advocates of privacy early in the design and application of 
identity management systems; the serious purpose of the system must be communicated 
and understood; and, the data must be limited to that purpose. 
Recommendation 41: The OSD PSA for Biometrics should request a broad 
review by the Office of General Counsel (OGC) of the privacy implications of biometrics 
use within the Department, which should be coordinated with the Department of Justice.  
Based on the results the PSA, in coordination with the Defense Privacy Board and the 
OGC, should create comprehensive biometrics privacy policies and strategies as required 
to support the range of defense missions, consonant with interagency efforts (TF on 
Biometrics 86-92). 
Department of Defense involvement in the shaping of policy and doctrine 
was expressed in the Report with the understanding that it was no longer possible to 
operate in a vacuum.  Higher level directives like HSPD-12 mandated that the DoD 
become actively involved with other governmental agencies, inter-governmental 
agencies, international agencies or allies, and the commercial sector.  The DoD is 
inextricably linked with all of these entities and has too much at stake to not try to direct 
the activities of all the constituencies in evaluating biometric or IdM policy and doctrine.  
For example, the DoD shares and exchanges biometric data with the FBI through the 
FBI’s IAFIS database.  Likewise, the DoD shares its biometric information with other 
federal departments like the Department of Homeland Security.  In order to achieve true 
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global capabilities, the DoD must leverage its relationships to maximize interoperability, 
standardization, and economies of scale.  Most importantly, the DoD needs to become an 
active stakeholder to ensure that international policies and technologies remain favorable 
to U.S. security priorities (TF on Biometrics 60). 
The TF ends the report by relating the importance of biometrics in 
identification and verification to the process of personnel security.  Government agencies 
and departments expend a lot of resources to properly vett personnel attempting to attain 
security clearances.  These clearances will then be used to protect our nation’s most 
important security information and systems.  Without tying a biometric to the individual 
investigated and possibly polygraphed, it is still possible for that person to fake their 
identity.  When understood from this perspective, biometrics would clearly add a much 
higher level of identity assurance when used to identify govenrment contractors or new 
recruits as it would throughout the personnel security process. 
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III. CURRENT DOD BIOMETRICS OPERATIONS: THE 
BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, a detailed overview of the operational component of the 
Biometrics Task Force (BTF)—Biometrics Operations Directorate located in Clarksburg, 
West Virginia is explored.  If someone wants to know what the Department of Defense is 
doing on a daily basis in regards to operational IdM, one of the best places to start is the 
Biometrics Task Force  Formerly known as the Biometrics Fusion Center, this specific 
facility is now referred to as the Biometrics Task Force — West.  The Plans and Policy 
component of the BTF, generally referred to as BTF — East, is located in Crystal City, 
VA.  Details and information about BTF operations were gathered from a personal tour 
of the facilities on December 16, 2008 and from the Unclassified materials supplied by 
the BTF — West personnel.4 
B. BACKGROUND & COMMAND STRUCTURE 
1. Background 
Following a study commissioned by Congress in 1999, it was determined that 
biometrics was an emerging technology that would have a significant impact on 
Department of Defense operations. As such, the use of biometric technologies needed to 
be coordinated, standardized, and funded.  The Biometrics Management Office (BMO) 
was established in 2000 under the Army’s Chief Information Officer (CIO) with the 
Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent for the DoD.  This action made the BMO 
the epicenter for all things biometrics in and among all the services and DoD agencies.  
                                                 
4 Specifically, I was able to coordinate the tour through Theresa Marinaro, BTF-W Office Assistant.  
My knowledgeable tour guide and general BTF representative was David Phares, Senior Project Manager 
with Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC).  The following people also generously made themselves 
available to answer my litany of questions during the tour: Kim Quinn of I3 — Deputy Operations 
Manager, DoD Enterprise Systems; Lauren — Ten Print / Latent Print Evaluator Supervisor; plus Karla 
Buckel and Robert Peters — Hardware Test Engineers also with CSC. 
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BMO focused primarily on Information Assurance (IA), specifically network access, but 
has iteratively broadened its scope as technology and operational requirements have 
evolved (Biometrics Task Force). 
Figure 3 below shows the most current chain of command for both BTF East and 
West.  The Secretary of the Army is Executive Agent (EA) who further delineated the 
Army G-3 as its acting EA.  The Secretary as Executive Agent reports to the Principal 
Staff Assistant (PSA) — Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDRE) — 
Director, Defense Biometrics (DDB).  Figure 3 also demonstrates the myriad of military 
and interagency relationships focused on biometrics within the DoD and U.S. 
Government (Lohman). 
 
Figure 3.   Biometrics Task Force Chain of Command 
2. Biometrics Task Force Structure 
Internally, the Biometrics Task Force has grown substantially since 2000 to 
include all of the directors, directorates, divisions displayed in Figure 4 (Lohman).  The 
facilities of the Biometrics Operations Directorate (BOD) that I specifically toured or was 
exposed to in one form or fashion — Operations, Resource & Support, and Technical 
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Management Divisions; as well as the twelve branches supporting the Directorate — are 
located in Clarksburg, WV.  The divisions and branches of the Biometrics Integration 
Directorate (BID) are located in Crystal City, VA.  There is a clear and purposeful 
separation of the operational side of the house from the policy and plans side.  One of the 
strongest reasons is to maximize and build upon the relationship between the FBI 
Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) and BTF operational elements (Zanger).  
This research will focus mainly on the Biometrics Operations Directorate of the BTF. 
 
Figure 4.   Biometrics Task Force Organizational Chart 
3. Biometrics Operations Directorate 
The Biometrics Operations Directorate has three main jobs: (1) operate the 
Automated Biometrics Identification System (ABIS) database containing Red and Gray 
Forces biometrics data, (2) test and evaluate biometrics equipment, and (3) support field 
operations of the equipment in use by the Services whether in theater or in the 
Continental United States (Biometrics Task Force).  Within the Biometrics Operations 
Directorate, there are three divisions with one being the Operations Division. The 
Operations Division has two missions.  The first mission is to provide immediate and 
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direct support to biometrics cells in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The Operations Division 
accomplishes this by being responsible for coordinating and managing issues and 
requests for information from the Combatant Commanders (COCOM) on all matters 
biometrics.  Its second role is to drive efforts throughout the Joint Forces to establish 
comprehensive biometrics training programs.  This longer term goal focuses on creating 
biometrics organizations within all COCOMs, developing a premiere operations center to 
support worldwide biometrics operations, and institutionalizing biometrics training 
(Biometrics Task Force). 
In order to help emphasize the push that biometrics was moving from theory to 
operations, the BTF was transferred from the Army’s Communications, Information, and 
Systems Directorate (CIO/G-6) to the Training and Operations Directorate (G-3/5/7) 
during FY07.  In addition, the Army and BTF deployed a Biometrics Torch Party to Iraq 
in early 2007 to begin standardizing issuance and training of biometrics equipment to 
units, developing biometrics concepts of operations (CONOPS) and standard operating 
procedures (SOPs), as well as increasing enrollments and watch list nominations.  The 
success of these Torch Parties in both Iraq and Afghanistan has led to approved Joint 
Manning Documents that will create permanent 11-man biometrics cells within both 
theater Headquarters (Biometrics Task Force). 
The second and third divisions within the Biometrics Operations Directorate are 
the Resources & Support Division (R&SD) and the Technical Management Division 
(TMD).  The Resources and Support Division of the Operations Directorate exists simply 
and plainly to support the BTF.  R&SD and its branches implement information 
technology, maintain overall security of facilities and resources, and manage all BTF 
resources across the DoD to support the Executive Manager for DoD Biometrics.  The 
Technical Management Division ensures the integrity and availability of the DoD’s 
biometrics data for appropriate users, and performs assessment, integration, 
interoperability, and testing of biometrics devices (Biometrics Task Force).  All new 
biometrics equipment must be tested and evaluated to ensure compliance with applicable 
ABIS and data standards.  In short, it has to be able to interface with ABIS and not create 
any vulnerability to the database (Zanger). 
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4. Joint Forces Initiatives 
Although not specifically part of any Biometrics Operations Directorate mission 
or focus, it is important to understand how the results of the Operations Directorate are 
implemented around the globe in a theater’s daily operations.  Through the Joint, 
Interagency, Multinational Coordination Branch of the BID, the Biometrics Task Force 
works directly with most of the Army’s sister Services in developing, testing, and 
fielding biometrics technologies.  More directly, the coordination between the Biometrics 
Task Force, U.S. Navy, and United States Marines Corp (USMC) has created substantial 
gains in biometric capabilities directed toward the Global War on Terrorism.  The U.S. 
Navy (since 2000 when it assigned its first liaison to the BTF) and the USMC (since 2005 
when it did the same) have been collaborating with the BTF on multiple IdM and 
biometric activities.  The following is a highlighted list of accomplishments that have 
occurred up to and through FY07 (Biometrics Task Force): 
a. Expanded Maritime Interception Operations (EMIO) 
To support the collection and processing of biometric activities during 
Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) operations, the BTF worked with the Navy to 
identify and purchase robust biometric equipment; to develop data transmission 
standards; and, to establish appropriate procedures.  The BTF’s Automated Biometrics 
Identification System (ABIS) provides near real-time search and response capabilities. 
EMIO Wireless Bridge. Navy and BTF worked to develop a 
wireless transmission capability compatible with ABIS.  30-plus ships are funded by the 
Navy for the Wireless Bridge capability. 
Tactical Biometrics Collection and Matching System (TBCMS). 
BTF provided funds to the Navy to develop a small, lightweight, ruggedized system to 
replace initial bulky biometric systems used for VBSS.  TCBMS was delivered in FY 07 
after the BTF completed laboratory and ABIS compatibility testing. 
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b. Identity Dominance System (IDS) 
BTF has supported Navy efforts for a holistic multimodal biometrics 
system of collection and verification that is scalable to different mission profiles.  IDS is 
being designed for interoperability, adherence to technical standards / policies, and 
network security accreditation.  In particular, the BTF has supported the Navy’s efforts 
with document reviews, recommendations, and support through the Joint Staff review 
process. 
c. USMC Biometr ic BAT- HIIDE ( Biometrics Automated Toolset 
— Handheld Intera gency Ide ntity Dete ction Equipment)  
Collaboration Initiatives 
(1) Fielded BAT and HIIDE training elements at Marine Air-
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Integrated Systems Training Centers for each Marine 
Expeditionary Force (MEF). 
(2) Provided BAT and HIIDE equipment to the USMC 
Corrections Specialist School at Lackland AFB. 
(3) Successfully conducted first, complete, biometrics, data 
refresh while underway during pre-deployment work-ups with the 22nd Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU). 
(4) Deployed 17 biometric field engineers to support Marines 
at the battalion level assigned to Multinational Forces — West. 
d. Latent Print Laboratory 
In coordination with Joint Chiefs of Staff, USN, BTF, and Naval Criminal 
Investigative Service (NCIS), established a Latent Print Laboratory at Camp Fallujah, 





C. THE DOD BIOMETRICS DATABASE — AUTOMATED BIOMETRICS 
IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (ABIS) 
1. The Evolution of ABIS 
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the DoD evolved its vision 
for biometrics to include the positive identification of known and suspected terrorists.  In 
addition to expanding the original intent of securing U.S. facilities and networks, the 
BMO and BFC would now have to generate a biometrics data collection, transmission, 
and storage system comparable to and compatible with the FBI’s Integrated Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) (Biometrics Task Force).  Three years later the 
DoD’s Automated Biometrics Identification System (ABIS) became operational.  ABIS 
serves as THE central storage for all DoD biometrics data, as well as being able to 
functionally cross-reference and exchange data with the FBI’s IAFIS.  ABIS is physically 
located in the BTF — West facilities in Clarksburg.  It is currently manned twenty-four 
hours a day/ seven days a week by contractors thanks to increases in manning and 
budgets, as compared to initially being manned on an as needed basis outside normal 
hours.  The day-to-day operation and maintenance of ABIS is being maintained under a 
Northrop- Grumman contract until the contract comes up for renewal at the end of FY 
2009 (Zanger). 
2. Basic Daily Operation 
So how does ABIS basically work?  The quad-chart in Figure 5 below gives a 
good visual summary of ABIS and its functioning (Quinn).  The ABIS operations center 
at BTF — West is manned 24/ 7 by a Biometrics Examination Services Team (BEST) in 
support of operations around the globe. They can send and receive data over Unclassified 
and Classified networks depending on the customer and their capabilities.  Within a small 
room in the BTF — West facilities, there are a large number of widescreen TVs and 
monitors that display a constant flow of requested fingerprint analysis against the ABIS 
and/or IAFIS databases.  These requests are monitored by specially trained I3 personnel 
who verify each transaction for compatibility with the ABIS database; make appropriate 
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changes to requests as necessary to ensure completeness; or, pass along the request to a 
Latent Print or Ten-Print Examiner (LPE or TPE) for further investigation when there is 
no match in the database (Zanger).  Each request coming in from around the world must 
be structured as close as possible to the Electronic Biometrics Transmission Specification 
(EBTS) to be processed by DoD’s ABIS or the FBI’s IAFIS.  Without the correct 
structure, it is difficult, sometimes impossible, for the ABIS operators to efficiently or 
effectively conduct a database query. 
 
Figure 5.   ABIS Quad-Chart Overview 
It is important to recognize the continuing need for a “person-in-the-loop” 
regarding ten print and latent print evaluators any time ABIS or IAFIS does not generate 
a match.  The dedicated TPE’s and LPE’s support BEST operations 24/7 alongside the 
ABIS operators.  TPE’s and LPE’s also share the same office space in close proximity to 
their ABIS operator brethren.  This closeness enables greater coordination and efficiency 
in supporting the boots on the ground.  The manual process of evaluating partial, 
fragmented, or distorted fingerprints will continue to be required until an ABIS or 
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database querying algorithm is created that can work off the smallest portion of a 
fingerprint.  The algorithms are getting better all the time, but this will probably still not 
happen anytime soon.  Meanwhile, operators are still sending to the BTF old fashioned, 
black ink, individual finger rolled print cards (Zanger). 
3. The Identity Dominance Process 
Within the DoD’s IdM and biometrics lexicon, the formal process from ground 
pounder to the database and back to the ground pounder is known as the Identity 
Dominance Process.   The Identity Dominance Process is comprised of five steps: (1) 
Collection, (2) Transmission, (3) Matching, (4) Storing / Sharing, and (5) Analysis.  
Collection is performed at the pointy end of the spear where multimodal biometrics data, 
biographical data, and contextual event data about the circumstances surrounding the 
reason for the collection are gathered and logged.  Transmission is self-explanatory and 
occurs by any means possible or available to the user /customer (e.g., NIPR, SIPR, 
SAT…).  However sent, the data must somehow reach the biometrics repository.  
Matching occurs either automatically through a database query or manually through 
human fingerprint examiners (e.g., TPE or LPE).  Storing and sharing involves the 
requirement that every piece of data sent, no matter how small, is permanently collected 
for potential future use.  Secondly, the results of the match query and the updated data are 
now transmitted back to the User and are made available for interagency sharing.  Lastly, 
Analysis deals with the development of watch lists, possible exploitation by the 
Intelligence or Information Warfare communities, and Force Protection (Quinn).  Figure 
6 presents a current example of the Identity Dominance Process. 
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Figure 6.   Identity Dominance Process Overview 
4. ABIS 2.0: NGA — Next Generation ABIS 
In January 2009, a major upgrade to the current ABIS system — NGA or Next 
Generation ABIS — became operational (Zanger).  It provides qualitative improvements 
over ABIS 1.0 in a multitude of areas.  One of the most prominent will be NGA’s ability 
to process multi-modal (fingerprints, iris, face, palm…) biometrics data.  Early 
operational results have shown that NGA can process biometrics in roughly one-third the 
time of ABIS 1.0.  It has also been able to positively match and ID a greater percentage 
of known or suspected terrorists due to its multi-modal capabilities.  To make the new 
system more manageable, scalable and responsive, NGA was originally designed to be 
partitioned into four different functional levels: Enterprise, Operational, Regional, and 
Man-portable.  The Enterprise ABIS is the ‘Master Database’ comprised of all Red and 
Gray Forces biometrics and relevant data with an initial capacity for over 2 million 
records.  Operational ABIS (e.g., CENTCOM) was expected to be a subset of 
approximately 500K to 2 million records that will be populated with likely individuals to 
be encountered in a specific AOR.  Regional ABIS (e.g., CJTF-HOA) was to be 
comprised of roughly 20K to 1 million individuals likely to be encountered.  Man-
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portable ABIS (e.g., Special Forces Operations) was proposed to be loaded onto 
ruggedized laptops with databases configured for specific mission needs.  Operational 
and Regional ABIS records were to be located on separate blade servers in the overall 
Enterprise ABIS server system.  Operational, Regional, and Man-portable were all to be 
fully recoverable and replicated from the Enterprise database as often as required or 
requested.  Each level was also to have Latent/Ten-print Examiner (LPE/TPE) 
capabilities of one extent or another.  Finally, all levels were to be integrated into a Terror 
Watchlist (Quinn).  In the end, however, NGA was able to avoid all the redundancy of 
data and resources without diminishing capability.  Operational connectivity in various 
AOR’s are required to maintain such a specific capacity that NIPR, SIPR, and wireless 
network connections have the capability to connect directly with NGA.  Therefore, 
Operational, Regional, and Man-portable versions of NGA have become unnecessary.  A 
summary visual of the originally proposed system is provided below in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7.   Next Generation ABIS Overview 
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D. RELATIONSHIPS AND THE FUTURE 
1. The BTF and FBI 
As mentioned earlier, a major impetus behind the original Biometrics Fusion 
Center (BFC) was to take advantage of the FBI’s technological capabilities and 
institutional knowledge about biometrics.  A lot of the BFC’s original biometrics 
operational concepts and database structure were heavily influenced on known, tested 
FBI capabilities.  Not by coincidence, the Federal Bureau of Investigations also has its 
CJIS campus located in Clarksburg, WV (Zanger)5.  To continue to foster interagency 
teamwork, current long range DoD plans are for the BTF to partner with the FBI to build 
a joint BTF-W and FBI CJIS facility on CJIS’s current property.  The DoD has already 
programmed funding for the joint facility, whereas the FBI is still awaiting funding 
approval.  If the FBI is unable to procure funding, the DoD will fall back to a planned 
separate facility co-located on the CJIS property.  In either case, the intent is to continue 
to leverage each other’s capabilities and maximize the potential from interoperable, 
interagency biometrics capabilities (Biometrics Task Force). 
2. The NearTerm 
Although the primary focus will always be on supporting the Warfighter, the 
Biometrics Task Force is collaborating with other services and agencies to move beyond 
just evaluating technologies that identify Red Forces or Grey Forces.  The near-term has 
seen a shift towards more active design, testing, and implementation of Blue Force 
business process biometrics (Zanger).  Such biometrics business processes include uses 
for health care records, prescription drugs, financial transactions, Humanitarian 
Assistance, Refugee Tracking, First Responders, and even re-enlistments.  One of the 
more prominent programs is IDProTECT, or Identification-based Decision Processes to 
Enable Confident Transactions.  IDProTECT is working towards providing a deployable 
system to enroll, verify, identify, and extract fingerprint and iris biometrics for members 
                                                 
5 The location of both facilities so near each other had some help from an important individual.  Each 
owes a lot to the Senior Senator from West Virginia — Robert C. Byrd. 
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who are eligible for enrollment in the Defense Manpower Data Center.  The goal is to 
make IDProTECT a net-centric capable system that can store, search, and match 
multimodal biometrics that can operate within current privacy acts, laws, and policies 
(Lohman).  Figure 8 below shows the IDProTECT concept in an informative quad chart.  
Programs like this are intended to help the DoD and her agencies to more accurately 
identify and track their own people and what business activities they can or cannot 
undertake.  This is the next wave in biometrics for the DoD and the Biometrics Task 
Force. 
 
Figure 8.   IDProTECT Overview 
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IV. BIOMETRIC MODALITIES & FUTURE OPTIONS 
A. CURRENT POPULAR BIOMETRIC MODALITIES 
1. Basic Biometrics Concepts 
Biometrics are simply measurable characteristics of an individual.  These 
characteristics can be subdivided into two categories — anatomical and behavioral.  
Examples of anatomical biometrics are fingers, iris, face, and hands.  Anatomical 
biometrics systems account for the vast majority of past and present biometric systems.  
Behavioral biometrics includes models such as signature, gate or walking, and even 
typing rhythm.  Although these might offer the potential to be more discriminating from 
anatomical biometrics, they are more difficult to measure because of variances across 
time.  If, for example, a biometric system is able to positively ID an individual by his 
gate, would that same system be able to positively ID the same individual with a broken 
leg? 
Despite biometric systems and technology slowly becoming more typical, 
biometrics has specific issues that do not help promote faster trust and integration.  The 
biggest of these concerns is the lack of standardization.  It most cases individual vendors 
are creating proprietary equipment that can only be used as per their specifications.  
Biometrics has not become a truly plug-and-play resource.  Within the DoD, this issue is 
partially being addressed by the BTF.  All new operational biometrics systems are 
technically supposed to be tested through the BTF before being deployed.  In most cases 
this is happening, but there are still outliers such as Special Operations Command who 
test and field their biometrics independently.  Appendix C gives a concise representation 
of biometrics timeline within the USG for the most significant biometric milestones since 
1967 (National Science & Technology Council 8-11).  Proprietary systems lead to other 
issues like a lack of interoperability or scalability.  As mandated or self-imposed 
standards evolve within the biometrics community, large business with the resources to 
implement biometrics will no longer be the only ones capable of doing so.  Standards will 
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allow businesses of any scale to install and leverage biometrics with whatever technology 
they currently operate.  Lastly, biometric systems and their use have sometimes acquired 
a connotation with an Orwellian Big Brother keeping track of every strand of DNA or 
personal detail.  A lack of general public knowledge on biometrics combined with a lack 
of open discussion and detailed product advertising has created an atmosphere of the 
unknown when it comes to biometrics.  Whatever the public does not understand, it will 
not feel comfortable purchasing, let alone using. 
If biometrics is to become as ubiquitous as USB thumb drives, the biometrics 
community and the federal government need to do more than let technology early 
adapters drive the momentum.  Appendix D highlights some operational milestones of 
biometrics within the federal government (National Science & Technology Council 23-
24).  Privacy issues can be countered with information like the fact that biometric data is 
separate from personal data.  Proprietary or otherwise developed biometrics systems take 
individual biometrics and process them through separate software algorithms.  These 
algorithms have been shown to be fully resistant to reverse-engineering back to the 
original biometric (National Biometric Security Project 5; sec. 1).  Because biometrics 
connect an individual to a stored digital identity, a business or organization can use this 
identity to allow or restrict both physical and logical access to resources.  Information 
assurance and IdM specialists can work with network administrators to set access 
controls appropriate for the individual’s role.  If incorporated properly, an organization 
can save resources in both time and money by using biometrics throughout its operations.  
With the growing access to and falling prices for biometrics, the average user can buy 
information systems, like a laptop, with biometrics incorporated for a small additional 
price.  As these individual users become more comfortable with biometrics and 
personally see their value, the word will spread more rapidly.  This thesis was produced 
on a Dell laptop with a fingerprint biometric reader.  Being one of the basic users in the 
population, I have personally benefitted from the ease of use and added security of 
biometrics.  Every laptop I buy in the future will have a biometric reader for security as a 
result of the confidence I have from their use, whether it comes pre-installed or as an 
added option. 
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In the Identity Triad mentioned in Chapter 2, biometrics gives the highest level of 
assurance by enabling identification through “something you are,” over “something you 
know” and “something you have.”    Regardless of the improved capability to ID an 
individual, biometrics is not seen as the end-all to identification.  The common belief is 
that biometrics should be used in combination with other technologies to offer true strong 
authentication (e.g., Use of CAC, strong passwords, and biometrics to be identified and 
verified by an IdM system).  The level of security required for physical and logical access 
to a specific system or facility will determine the necessary combinations of technologies.  
All biometric systems process biometrics in essentially the same manner, just 
through different technologies.  Each system is a pattern recognition system that is used 
to collect a biometric for enrollment, process the captured biometric using vendor-based 
algorithms, and then store or attempt to compare for identification or verification to an 
enrolled digital template of the biometric.  This basic process is depicted in Figure 9 
(National Biometric Security Project 6; sec. 2).  The captured digital biometric is often 
referred to as the biometric template from which all other potential identifications or 
verifications will be referenced against.  Templates are frequently referenced against a 
token or password for greater access control depending on the level of security desired.  
With some technologies, it is necessary to collect multiple images in order to generate a 
quality template.  A biometric systems’ ability to generate a quality template for future 
use, and therefore determine its utility, is dependent on the software’s algorithm 
processing.  As has been mentioned previously, the difficulty with incorporating 
biometric systems into existing information architectures is the proprietary algorithms by 




Figure 9.   General Biometric System 
Because each biometric technology has strengths and weaknesses based on the 
intended application, it is important to have a complete and clear understanding of the 
intended usage for the biometric before researching or purchasing the technology.  The 
following is a list of categories that can be used to evaluate the application of a biometric: 
1) Overt or covert systems—Will the user proactively and knowingly be 
identified by the system or will it be designed to covertly scan the secured 
area? Either way, a person must have a biometric template on file for 
him/her to be recognized. 
2) Voluntary or involuntary systems—Will system users be required to 
participate in the system to receive access or benefits, or are there opt-out 
or work-around options? 
3) Attended or non-attended systems—Will the system be designed for 
people to use in a remote location, without assistance? Or will users 
always have technical assistance and/or attendants available? Involuntary 
and/or covert systems may always require supervision or attendance to 
monitor system use. Voluntary and/or overt systems may be “unattended.” 
4) Standard or non-standard operating environments—How much 




the network to communicate and function properly?  Will the system be 
used outdoors or indoors?  Outdoors environments typically fall into “non-
standard” operating environments. 
5) Public or private systems—Is the use of the biometric system for a 
public program or access to a public facility, or for access to a private 
company or information? Cooperation with the biometric system can often 
be directly attributed to whether a system is public or private (i.e., 
employees). 
6) Physical security and access control—Are users trying to gain access to 
a facility or area? 
7) Cyber and computer/network security—Are users trying to gain access 
to a computer or protect information on a computer or the Internet? 
8) Identification—Is the biometric being used for identification purposes for 
access to benefits, information, border crossing, licensing, etc.?  (National 
Biometric Security Project 10-12; sec. 2). 
Biometrics can generate positive identifications in one of two modes — 
identification or verification.  When operating in an identification mode, a biometrics 
system is attempting to determine whether or not a given biometric sample matches any 
of all known biometric templates within a system’s database.  This is often referred to as 
a one-to-many (1:N) or open-set identification and is used in applications applicable to 
law enforcement or terrorist watch lists.  The verification process attempts to match a 
given biometric template against a stored template for a specific user.  This is often 
referred to as a one-to-one (1:1) or closed-set identification.  During the enrollment 
process, the user associates their name, and ID number, or even a token with their 
biometric template to later verify their identity (National Biometric Security Project 12; 
sec. 2).  Because no system works to one hundred percent perfection, there are two 
general classes of possible errors that biometrics can create during identification or 
verification.  The first is a comparison error where the machine’s functioning can 
generate either a false match or false non-match.  A false match is an incorrect template 
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match to a given biometric.  A false non-match is a false conclusion that a given template 
is not in the system’s database.  A second class of error is a decision error based on the 
erroneous assessment from a comparison error (National Biometric Security Project 14; 
sec. 2).  When a system mistakenly matches a given biometric to a database template, the 
system’s application generates a false accept and allows access to the system as a result.  
Further, the probability that this will actually occur with a particular system’s application 
is known as the false accept rate — FAR.  If the biometric system’s application 
mistakenly concludes that a given biometric template does not reside in the database, the 
application generates a false reject and will deny access.  Probability of the application 
rejecting a valid biometric is termed the false reject rate — FRR. 
Although not all encompassing by any means, the previous paragraphs offer 
enough detail to allow a generalized understanding and details by which to compare 
different biometric technologies.  More thorough comparisons of the technologies would 
require researching the ease of different biometrics to enroll Users, different template 
storage options, specific components of biometric systems, operational applications for 
biometrics, and how different biometrics perform in specific IdM architectures.  These 
fall outside the intended scope of this thesis, and can be researched separately. 
2. Fingerprint Recognition 
Fingerprint recognition is the oldest and most widely used biometric for both 
business and operational processes.  British law enforcement first began to use manual 
fingerprint identification of criminals in the late nineteenth century.  In the 1960s, 
fingerprint recognition and identification began to move from a manual to an automated 
process with the introduction of computers.  With the assistance of the National Institute 
for Standards and Technology (NIST), the FBI began to research the automatic 
classification, searching and matching of fingerprints in the late 1960s (NSTC — 
Fingerprint 1).  Over the next thirty years, the FBI progressed from basic scanners and 
automated inked fingerprint digitizers to the current fully automated IAFIS system 
described brifely in Chapter III.  Despite initial roll-outs of stand-alone state and 
international law enforcement fingerprint recognition systems based on individual 
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standards, fingerprint recognition systems both within the U.S. and internationally have 
increasingly adopted common standards to allow greater exchange of fingerprint data.   
A digital scan or manual roll of a fingerprint will look like a series of alternating 
dark and white lines.  The dark portions of the fingerprint represent ridges, and the white 
space valleys.  The location where ridges stop are termed ridge endings.  Where the 
ridges split are termed ridge bifurcations.  Ridge endings and bifurcations are further 
known as fingerprint minutae.  In the most general sense, the patterns created by these 
two distinguishing features or the location of specific minutae help build a model for 
individual fingerprints that can be used to uniquely ID someone.  Fingerprint recognition 
software is generally designed to either match overall fingerprint patterns or minutae 
patterns.  Figure 10 gives an example of different types of fingerprint images and 
terminology to describe features (NSTC — Fingerprint 3).  Hardware can collect 
fingerprints individually, four to five fingers at a time, or all ten fingerprints 
simultaneously.  These collections can then either be slap or rolled.  Slapped fingerprints 
collect an image from the fingernail to the first knuckle.  Rolled prints collect images 
from one side of a fingernail to the other side.  The best device to use will varies by the 
time available to capture images and the intended purpose of the fingerprint system. 
 






3. Iris Recognition 
Iris recognition is one of the newer biometric modalities used today in IdM.  An 
automated method for recognizing irises did not receive a patent until 1994 (NSTC — 
Iris 1).  Iris recognition is reasonably straight-forward.  The structure or pattern and color 
of an individual’s irises are developed prior to birth and remain stable over a lifetime.  
Even though an person’s irises are genetically the same, their individual irises have 
separate and distinct patterns.  To perform iris recognition, a digital image of the pattern 
in an iris is collected and quantified using a low or high-resolution camera.  Before the 
image can be taken, however, the iris must be localized to exclude “image noise” from 
eyelashes, eyelids, pupils, reflections (NSTC — Iris 2).  The collected image is then 
mapped by dividing the iris into phasors or segments.  Each phasor is mapped for its 
orientation within the iris along with the iris’ individual pattern.  The final image 
generated is referred to as an IrisCode® and becomes the basis for future comparisons.  
Figure 11 visually represents both the basic structure of an eye and two sample irises. 
 
Figure 11.   Iris Diagram and Structure 
4. Facial Recognition 
Facial recognition is reasonably one of the most innate biometric modalities since 
most people use the face to recognize one another anyway.  Despite the intuitiveness of 
facial recognition as a concept, the process of facial recognition is far from being 
standardized with any specific recognition method dominating.  The different approaches 
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to facial recognition are geometric (facial features based), photometric (view based), and 
algorithm based.  Within the algorithm based approach, there are three major types of 
algorithms — Principal Components Analysis (PCA), Linear Discriminant Analysis 
(LDA), and Elastic Bunch Graph Matching (EBGM) (NSTC — Face 2).  PCA uses a 
collected image in comparison to a gallery of algorithmic generated images referred to as 
eigenfaces6.  Both the collected and gallery images generally require a full frontal image.  
LDA uses a statistically analytic algorithm to classify an image against within-class 
(within individual’s class of photos) or against samples of images between-class (across 
all individual image classes) (NSTC — Face 3).  EBGM focuses on the non-linear 
characteristics of real images such as pose, illumination, or expression to generate an 
elastic grid image with “Gabor jets” that mark distinctive facial nodes (National 
Biometric Security Project 7; sec. 3).  The three algorithms are visualized in Figure 12. 
(1)    (2)   
(3)   
Figure 12.   (1) PCA, (2) LDA and (3) EBGM Facial Recognition Examples 
                                                 
6 Eigenfaces is derived from the well known mathematical technique of Principal Component Analysis 
based on eigen vectors. 
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B. BEHAVIORAL BIOMETRICS 
1. Overview of Behavioral Biometrics 
Behavioral biometrics are defined as behavioral traits learned and acquired over 
time, rather than ones based primarily on biology (National Biometric Security Project 
41; sec. 2).  The most dominant forms of behavioral biometrics are voice recognition and 
dynamic signature.  Newer potential behavioral biometrics include gait recognition (i.e., 
the manner in which a person walks) and typing recognition.  Using behavioral 
biometrics can add a fourth dimension — something you do — to the ID Trinity as a 
result of the obvious requirement for the individual to perform an action as part of the 
verification process.  This fourth dimension strengthens the security benefits of one or 
more of the original three forms of the ID Trinity when used in combination.  This should 
intuitively make sense.  If a static biometric statistically offers the highest level of 
certainty in positive identification, a behavioral biometric which is acquired over years of 
repetition and also distinctly personal will provide an even greater magnitude of certainty 
if appropriately processed.  The ability to generate an algorithm which quickly and 
without excessive repetition captures a template, and then make minute adjustments over 
time, is the hurdle to overcome for successful behavioral biometrics. 
2. Voice Recognition 
Voice recognition, sometimes also referred to as speaker verification, is a 
behavioral biometric that uses the voice of an individual to positively make an 
authentication.  Each person’s voice is influenced by the physical structure of their vocal 
tract as well as behavioral characteristics like mouth movement and pronunciation.  
Voice recognition should not be confused with speech recognition that recognizes spoken 
words and is not a type of biometric.  There are two forms of voice recognition — text-
dependent and text-independent (NSTC — Speaker 2).  When using the text-dependent 
method, an individual must present the same specific password or phrase used during 
enrollment.  Text-dependent speaker recognition increases the performance of a 
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biometric system because the system has a preprogrammed model for comparison.  Text-
independent systems offer greater flexibility because there does not need to be any 
specific word of phrase for enrollment or verification.  Speech variations in duration, 
intensity, or pitch are modeled into multiple vector “states” to be used for later 
verification.  The representation of a voice sample plotting voice loudness in the top and 
voice spectral analysis in the bottom is shown in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13.   Speaker Recognition Voice Sample 
Voice recognition is a popular behavioral biometric because of its low cost and 
ease of use.  A voice recognition system can be layered on top of already existing 
telephone or cell phone lines which reduce start-up and long-term infrastructure costs.  
Prevalent uses for voice recognition include physical access control to spaces, phone 
banking, call center authentication (e.g., home alarm systems), and even house arrest 
monitoring (National Biometric Security Project 43; sec.3).  With the ability to verify an 
individual remotely, voice recognition can enable automated access to resources or 
services while simultaneously reducing overhead costs.  Drawbacks include susceptibility 
to transmission noise, inability to control the system used for input if done remotely, and 
possible spoof attacks using a recorded voice (NSTC — Speaker 4). 
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3. Dynamic Signature Verification 
Dynamic signature verification collects dynamic data such as the speed, pressure, 
shape, and direction with which an individual writes their signature.  After the capture of 
a few samples to form a template, all the individual is required to do is write their 
signature for future positive identification.  Like many of the other biometrics, dynamic 
signature verification was not logically possible until computer systems were able to 
process such algorithms starting in the 1970s.  As such, dynamic signature as a tool in 
IdM is a relatively new option.  This biometric should not be confused with the 
ubiquitous electronic signature capture devices used in the retail or shopping industries.  
Electronic signature devices simply capture the physical signature for replication and are 
not a biometric.  Figure 14 presents one of many possible options to input a dynamic 
signature, as well a visual representation of the actual signature and measurements 
(NSTC — Signature 1). 
Because dynamic signatures are nearly impossible to duplicate as compared to a 
static signature image, it is a very secure method to authenticate an individual.  Some 
dynamic signature algorithms also incorporate learning functions which adjust the 
individual signature template to account for natural user variability over time. 
 
Figure 14.   Dynamic Signature Input and Measurements Example 
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C. USE CASE: BLUE FORCE E-BUISNESS DYANMIC SIGNATURE 
VERIFICATION 
1. The Device: DynaSig Bio-Pen 
A dynamic signature biometric like the DynaSig Bio-Pen and accompanying Lock 
Box software is a flexible security and IdM tool.  It is well suited for certain sectors of 
the business community, like the banking industry or package shipping industry, where 
identification and verification are mandatory requirements for business processes and 
auditing.  Dynamic signature devices easily incorporate a readily used device — a pen — 
and accompanying software into current business operations.  There is no need for any 
extensive vendor training, and only a minimal requirement on IT resources.  Bank tellers 
and managers, for example, require an extensive auditing trail to ensure that both the 
bank and customer are protected from fraud.  Signatures in combination with 
identification like a driver’s license have been the standard.  The ability to capture in real-
time and store indefinitely the verified digital signatures of both customer and bank 
employee helps nearly eliminate ID fraud and its enormous costs. 
The DynaSig Bio-Pen and Lock-Box software offer a simple, user friendly, 
behavioral biometric toolset for establishing and maintaining secure transactions, IdM, 
data protection, and a continuous auditing trail.  Figure 15 shows a detailed view of the 
interior components of a Bio-Pen (Kim, Bio-Pen Presentation 6).  The Bio-Pen collects 
motion, pressure, acceleration, timing… in all three axis — X, Y, and Z — through the 
onboard equipment.  Each pen is individually serialized in the hardware to provide a 
unique ID to the owner and to the firmware when the USB is connected.  Every time the 
Bio-Pen is used, it generates a unique code, equivalent to a time-stamp, to counter 
potential replay attacks.  When an owner writes with the Bio-Pen, the software algorithm 
creates a unique “signature” that is combined with the two previous pieces of data, 
encrypted, and sent to the database for comparison (Kim, Bio-Pen White Paper: Security 
Features).  The verified combination of all three pieces of encrypted data provides a high 
level of security and trust that the person using the pen and the dynamic signature 
presented are all valid. 
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Figure 15.   DynaSig Bio-Pen Components 
Figure 16 displays some of the Bio-Pen tip and body options available.  The Bio-
Pen can be configured to work with an ink cartridge as a normal pen, with a stylus 
designed for PDA’s, or even with a stylus designed for Tablet PC’s (Kim, Bio-Pen 
Applications 5).  The configuration of the pen is flexible to the business process or 
requirement, and is easily reconfigurable to move from one to the next. 
 
 
Figure 16.   DynaSig Bio-Pen Tip & Body Options 
Along with the digital measures of security explained previously, the combination 
Bio-Pen and Lock Box software offer some other distinct advantages: 
1. Writing a signature is an instinctive, habitual behavioral action. 
2. Nearly impossible to impersonate an individual dynamic signature. 
3. No passwords to lose or remember. 
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4. No personal data is created or attached to the system. 
5. Personal authentication can be accomplished from anywhere with an 
Internet connection. 
6. Highly scalable to the needs and size of an organization. 
7. Software adapts to dynamic signature variation over time through 
automated updates. 
8. Digital and, if desired, physical auditing data ensure non-repudiation. 
Like any other dynamic signature biometric, there are a few potential drawbacks 
depending on the working environment: 
1. Owner or User must be able to write a signature. 
2. Users with continuously variable signatures will have difficulty enrolling 
and verifying. 
3. Software must be able to adjust for variations in signature over time. 
4. Best applications are staff, administration, business, and e-business 
environments. 
2. The Scenario: Military Logistics Tracking and Authorization 
Twenty-four hours a day — seven days a week, the four U.S. military Services 
prepare, transport, and deliver vital military equipment and resources.  Like many other 
global businesses, the four Services need to positively verify that the right materials were 
loaded onto the right transport, arrived at the right location, and were delivered to the 
intended customer on time.  If something did not go according to the plan, there needs to 
be a secure real-time system that allows the logistical chain of command to access the 
most current information and determine a new course of action.  The information which 
will be used for current and future planning can only be trusted if the individual updating 
the system can be verified for both positive identification and system access privileges, 
then has their verified identity attached to the data for non-repudiation and auditing.  
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Without a reliable verification tool as part of an Identity Management Architecture to 
assure these requirements, all information is suspect until proven otherwise. 
This problem has multiple parts that need to be addressed simultaneously in order 
to at least maintain or preferably improve the data entry, individual verification, and 
logistic processing timeline.  Here are some of the more important questions that need to 
be addressed:  How can the system positively ID each individual?  Can there be 
assurance that the individual identified is not an imposter?  How can the system then 
attach the ID to their data?  How can the system ensure the individual entering data is 
authorized and accredited?  Is it possible to do all this in real-time?  Is there a method or 
device which ensures the highest level of security while not mandating added layers of 
requirements and resources? 
In short, yes.  Specifically, the DynaSig Bio-Pen dynamic signature device can 
meet these requirements while easily integrating into whatever logistics process is being 
performed.  From the moment resources are ordered, an audit trail is being produced for 
current and future use.  The person who orders the materials can either do it in person 
with physical paperwork, or more expeditiously through digital documents.  The 
customer must be verified and offer proof of eligibility by generally signing a document.  
Whether in a physical or digital signature, the Bio-Pen dynamic signature device can be 
used to complete the order.  From this stage and at every logistic point of processing 
thereafter, each individual offers their signature as part of the process.  Their verified 
signature will instantaneously and automatically be added to the business process 
documents, as well as the systems’ auditing mechanism.  This data will then be available 
to all access approved individuals.  Even if a physical auditing trail is required at one 
specific location, the Bio-Pen can simultaneously write an ink signature and digital 
signature fulfilling the requirement. 
At any point in the process a higher degree of security such as CAC access to an 
information system can be added.  Individual commands can tailor their specific security 
requirements while the entire system is assured of the data and the data’s owner.  
Dynamic signatures provide a nearly impossible to duplicate behavioral biometric with 
an inherently high level of security.  If a product like the DynaSig Bio-Pen is 
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incorporated into the process, the individual using the pen will be known to have been 
vetted for and given specific access control privileges.  A DynaSig Bio-Pen would be 
ubiquitous in its operation because everyone throughout the chain of command has or is 
required to use their signature at some point.  There is no requirement for any form of 
training.  In summary, a DynaSig Bio-Pen is a low cost, easy to use, behavioral biometric 
that scales to even the largest enterprise architecture.  A dynamic signature verification 
process layered onto any logistical process instantly provides increased IdM, security, 
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V. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The federal government and all its agencies are working very hard to determine 
how best to implement a realistic and executable Federal Identity Management 
Enterprise.  Simultaneously, these efforts are not being effectively coordinated despite 
the unanimous understanding that standardization and coordination are necessary key 
elements.  Regardless of the necessity or agreement, there are always agencies, 
departments or individuals who do not want to share their information or feel only their 
ideas are acceptable.  These issues are unavoidable and serve only to slow the IdM 
Enterprise from gaining momentum and being implemented.  Despite the real or 
perceived roadblocks, progress is being made towards universal solutions.  Eventual IdM 
Enterprise systems will spring from the systems being used and developed today.  In the 
DoD, such precursor systems include the Biometric Identification System for Access 
(BISA) used to identify non-military personnel trying to gain access to coalition facilities, 
or the Defense Biometrics Identifications System (DBIDS) which verifies personnel 
trying to gain access to U.S. military facilities and is operated by the Defense Manpower 
Data Center (DMDC) through military law enforcement.  Individual systems like these 
will be evaluated over time for ease of use, security of data, effectiveness, and scalability.  
Systems that excel will be expanded.  The rest will be discontinued.  Other federal 
departments like the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice are 
experimenting with systems in a likewise fashion.  In the future, all of these systems will 
be integrated in either a logical or physical fashion to support a holistic Federal IdM 
Enterprise. 
This thesis attempted to take a snapshot in time of the current state of affairs in 
federal IdM and biometrics, while specifically focusing on the Department of Defense.  
The information contained in this thesis is by no means all encompassing.  It should be 
considered nothing more than a significant primer on the subjects at best.  Necessary and 
substantial topics that will also need to be addressed include: (1) legal issues concerning 
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the collection, storage, and use of U.S. citizen personal data; (2) social implications to 
gaining widespread use and trust of identity management tools like biometrics; and, (3) 
development of standards that enable physically separate systems to exchange data 
logically in order to meet operational or business needs.  No holistic solution is possible 
without addressing and presenting long-term solutions that stay within the boundaries of 
the U.S. Constitution, meet process requirements, and guarantee the security and integrity 
of the data. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The field of Identity Management does not have the recognition or precedence 
behind it commensurate with its current value.  Every day people are walking across U.S. 
borders or landing at U.S. airports trying to gain access to the nation.  No one needs to be 
reminded the country is at war, and the requirement for maintaining the security of 
American citizens never stops.  Billions of tax-payer funded dollars are stolen annually 
through identity theft because minimally paid or under skilled workers are entrusted with 
safeguarding personal data on technology they do not understand.  Even worse, these 
federal or state employees sometimes just sell the data or credentials to make a quick 
buck without regard to their fellow citizens and to the damage to their country.  What do 
agencies do when breaches happen?  In some cases, the incidence and its details are kept 
in close hold.  It is hoped that in most cases, the breach, those victimized, and a solution 
are presented to help minimize the damage.  In either case, potential and actual victims 
are at the mercy of the agency for information because there is no reciprocity in regards 
to personal data access.  Only the agencies and its employees have access to an 
individual’s collected personal data.  Outcomes such as these arising from unsecured 
personal data on USG systems which lack full transparency are no longer acceptable to 
the American public. 
First, resources and focus must be put into education.  Educating the personnel 
who will operate current and future IdM architectures within an overarching Federal IdM 
Enterprise must be a priority.  Academic institutions like West Virginia University and 
the Naval Postgraduate School have seen this requirement and have implemented courses 
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of instruction towards that end.  West Virginia University has targeted undergraduate and 
graduate courses in biometrics, identity management, and computer security.  The Naval 
Postgraduate School recently established a federal certification in Identity Management 
tailored purposely for military and civil service professionals in the biometrics and IdM 
fields.  If federal and state governments make it known that these particular fields are of 
great concern, public and private educational institutions will invest the resources to 
create applicable course and degrees. 
Secondly, all agencies and departments of the federal government must 
acknowledge that a new field of IdM professionals is vitally required.  Within the DoD, 
the Services need to definitively delineate IdM and biometrics positions or billets from 
their information technology specialists.  For instance, the U.S. Navy’s information 
technology specialists come from the Information Professional (IP) Community.  IP’s can 
be detailed to a range of billets with specialties that include information assurance, 
knowledge management, or communications.  There is, however, no recognition for the 
need to designate or create billets that focus on identity management or biometrics.  The 
Navy and her sister Services need to acknowledge this major oversight, and then work 
the manning documents to correct.  This process and mentality needs to permeate the 
USG as a whole. 
The public is only minimally aware of the impact and influence that IdM and 
biometrics is going to play in their future daily lives.  As thoughtful and logical 
discussions begin to take place outside the Beltway of Washington, DC, Americans will 
be exposed to the benefits and detractors of a Federal IdM Enterprise.  National, state, 
and local leaders themselves need to grasp the basic concepts so that they can lead these 
necessary discussions.  The train bringing nationalized IdM and biometrics in some form 
or fashion has already left the station.  Now is the time for the American public to decide 
what kind of Federal IdM Enterprise they will accept, and their government to implement 
it. 
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APPENDIX A — NSTC STRUCTURE 
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APPENDIX C — GENERAL TIMELINE OF FEDERAL 









APPENDIX D — BIOMETRICS OPERATIONS TIMELINE 
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